We present a simple model which establishes a non linear and possibly non monotonic relationship between Þnancial development and economic growth. Applying a threshold regression model to King and Levine's (1993) data set, we Þnd evidence that is consistent with the main implications stemming from the theoretical model. JEL Classification: E44, O16
Introduction
Various models of joint determination of real and Þnancial structure like, for instance, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) , Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) , and Khan (2001) , present a non linear relationship between Þnancial and economic development. In these models, endogenously emerging Þnancial institutions have generally a positive effect on growth whose magnitude varies positively with the level of economic development. We present a simple OLG model with risk averse agents and costly Þnancial transactions such that the impact of Þnancial development on growth is, similarly to the existing literature, positively related to the level of economic development. However, differently from the existing literature, in this model, the growth effect of Þnancial development is ambiguous at low levels of development, while it becomes eventually positive as development proceeds. 1 Applying a threshold regression model to King and Levine's (1993) data set, we Þnd evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis implied by our model. SpeciÞcally, we Þnd that in low income countries there is no signiÞcant relationship between Þnancial development and growth whereas in high income countries we Þnd that this relationship is positive and strongly signiÞcant. 2 While these Þndings are consistent with our model they are not entirely compatible with models which predict that Þnancial development is associated with higher growth rates at all levels of economic development.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model while section 3 presents the empirical methodology and the results. Section 4 concludes.
The model

3
Assume an OLG economy with a mass 1 of inÞnitely lived Þrms and a mass 1 of identical individuals living for two periods and endowed with a unit of labour in their Þrst period of life. Let U = c 1−ρ 2,t be the utility function, where c 2,t is second 1 Obstfeld (1994) , Deveraux and Smith (1994) and Jappelli and Pagano(1994) also present theoretical models in which Þnancial development might have negative growth effects as long as it affects adversely the propensity to save. Yet in these models, the growth impact does not vary with the level of economic development. Furthermore, their results are based on the idea that the substitution effect dominates the income effect induced by changes in the return to savings associated with Þnancial development, while in our model the ambiguity of the growth impact of Þnancial development relies on the absorption of economic resources by the Þnancial sector and does not hinge on any particular assumption regarding the sensitivity of the propensity to save with respect to the rate of return.
2 These Þndings are also consistent with Xu (2000) who Þnds that countries concentrated in the low or lower middle income group in his sample display negative cumulative effects of Þnancial development on the growth of GDP and investment, while the reverse is true for the countries concentrated in the higher income group of the sample. The results are also consistent with those of Demetriades and Hussein (1996) who fail to Þnd cointegration between Þnance and growth in one third of the developing countries in their sample. 3 The model we present is based on Deidda (2001).
2 period consumption for a member of generation t. Accordingly, each young agent of generation t supplies inelastically labour to Þrms in their Þrst period of life earning a salary w t which is entirely saved. Savings take two possible forms: deposits and/or self-Þnancing of investment related to accumulation of physical capital K t+1 = I t , 4 to be used in production according to the production function 1 ) where x(φ) ∼ iid(φ, σ 2 ), and A t = K t /l t . Firms have access to a similar production technology, the only difference being in the total productivity parameter, which we assume to be x(ψ) ∼ iid(ψ, σ 2 ), with ψ > φ. If Þnancial transactions were feasible, agents would be able to diversify risk and moreover savings could be channelled toward the more productive technology available to Þrms. Assume that Þnancial transactions imply a Þxed cost E, expressed as absorption of physical resources. Therefore, the single intermediary, which in equilibrium operates at zero proÞts, will be able to guarantee a safe return on deposits equal to 2) where w t = (1 − α)y t . The certain equivalent to self-Þnanced investment is
with v = (1 − ρα 2 σ 2 /2) < 1. As long as the higher moments of x(φ) are negligible compared to σ 2 , the utility derived from the uncertain return to self-Þnancing is approximately equal to that derived by the certain equivalent return R c * . 6 Under this hypothesis then, the comparison between (2.2) and (2.3), then suggests that 4 We assume full capital depreciation. 5 The intermediary makes zero expected proÞts otherwise it would be undercut by potential competitors. We also note that, in equilibrium, the expected return on loans is, ex ante, equal to the expected marginal productivity of capital, so that Þrms, which are risk neutral, make zero expected proÞts. Finally, since productivity is an independently and identically distributed random variable across Þrms, the bank is able to fully diversify risk so that the ex-post return is equal to its expected value ex ante. 6 Note that in the special case in which x(φ) is normally distributed the expected utility derived from the uncertain return is exactly equal to that associated to its certain equivalent. The assumption of normality is tenable as long as, given the mean and the variance of x(φ), the probability attached to negative realisations of x(φ) is negligible, so that x(φ) takes virtually only positive values. Finally we note that the use of the certain equivalent would be always legitimate if we were to assume a quadratic utility function. We adopted a CRRA utility speciÞcation to simplify the exposition of the key results of the model. 3 agents will be willing to save in form of deposits for
Will endogenously emerging Þnancial intermediation necessarily have an immediate growth effect? The equilibrium growth rate under Þnancial intermediation is
Comparison between the two growth rates indicates that if Þnancial intermediation emerges at y * the immediate growth rate is surely negative. Of course the level of income in the period of transition from Þnancial autarky to Þnancial intermediation might well be higher than y * . In particular it can be any level between y * and
the growth rate of the economy under Þnancial intermediation is
Comparison with the growth rate under Þnancial autarky yields:
It is easy to verify that there are combinations of the various parameters which fulÞl our assumptions and satisfy inequality (2.5) with the " < " sign. In simple words, Þnancial development might initially have unambiguously detrimental growth effects. More generally, even if (2.5) is satisÞed with the ">" sign, as long as the level of income in the transition period is sufficiently close to y * the immediate growth impact of Þnancial development could be still negative or equal to zero. The intuition for this result is that risk averse agents might prefer to incur Þnancial transaction costs even though the net expected return to savings they get is lower than that under Þnancial autarky, which implies that the growth rate of the economy will also be lower than under Þnancial autarky. This is because Þnancial transactions enable them to diversify risk, and since they are risk averse 7 For y t ≈ y * , agents are actually indifferent between self-Þnancing their investment activity and deposits to the extent that R c * ≈ R d t . According to standard principles we assume that under these circumstances, they choose deposits. 4 they might prefer a lower but safe return to the uncertain return associated with self-Þnanced investments. This unpleasant result includes the possibility that the growth rate becomes negative as the economy switches to Þnancial intermediation. This leads to the possibility of vicious circles that the economy cannot possibly escape, such that the economy switches to Þnancial intermediation as it reaches y * and then experiences negative growth such that the level of income falls below y * so that Þnancial autarky is restored (see Þgure 4.1, page 10 for an exposition of the various possibly dynamic paths of the model economy). Alternatively, if we assume that the growth rate stays positive, the economy will approach a steady state growth rate g F I | y t →∞ = (1 − α)ψ − 1. This growth rate is surely greater than that under Þnancial autarky. Hence, Þnancial intermediation might ultimately bring positive growth effects. Yet, this simple model establishes a non linear, possibly non monotonic, relationship between Þnancial development and growth such that the growth impact of Þnancial development depends positively on the level of economic development. In low income countries the impact of Þnan-cial development tends to be comparatively lower than in high income economies. Moreover, in low income economies the growth impact of Þnancial development can be negligible or even negative.
Empirical evidence
Methodology. We use cross-country regressions to test the non monotonic relationship between Þnancial depth and growth. We estimate a model similar to that of King and Levine (1993) where the real growth of per capita income is regressed on initial real income per capita, the initial secondary enrollment rate and the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP as an indicator of Þnancial depth. In addition to this base regression, we include the ratio of trade to GDP, the ratio of government spending to GDP, the average inßation rate, the index of civil liberties and the number of revolutions to control for other economic phenomena. 8 We use King and Levine's dataset which covers 119 countries over the period 1960-1989. 9 The model is estimated using a threshold regression model that takes the following form:
8 See King and Levine (1993) , Levine and Zervos (1998) among others for a motivation of similar empirical speciÞcations. 9 For a detailed description of the data set, see King and Levine (1993) . 2 ) where q i is the threshold variable used to split the sample into different regimes or groups; y i is the dependent variable; x i is an m-vector of regressors and e i is the error term. This model allows the regression parameters to switch between regimes depending on the value of q i . By deÞning a dummy variable d i (γ) = {q i ≤ γ} (where {.} is the indicator function) and setting x i (γ) = x i d i (γ), we can represent equations 1-2 by a single equation:
where θ 0 = θ 0 2 , δ and γ are the regression parameters. The threshold model is estimated using least squares (LS). The LS point estimatorsγ,θ, andδ are those that minimize the residual sum of squares. To test for the null of no threshold against the alternative of threshold, we use the heteroskedasticity-consistent Lagrange multiplier (LM) test statistic (Hansen, 1996 (Hansen, , 2000 . Since the threshold γ is not identiÞed under the null hypothesis, the p-values are calculated by bootstrap methods. 11 We use the bootstrap analog suggested by Hansen (1996 Hansen ( , 2000 which produces asymptotically correct p-values for the threshold estimate. To derive the asymptotic distribution of the slope coefficients, we can proceed as if the threshold estimate were the true value. In this case, the slope parameters are shown to be asymptotically normal with a standard asymptotic covariance matrix (Chan, 1993; Hansen, 2000) .
Empirical Results. Using initial income per capita as the threshold variable, we Þnd that the p-values for the threshold models are signiÞcant at the conventional levels (Table 1 ). This suggests that we can split the sample into two income groups (low income and high income groups). This holds whether we use the base regression (model 1) or after controlling for the ratio of trade to GDP, the ratio of government spending to GDP and the average inßation rate (model 2), plus the index of civil liberties and the number of revolutions (model 3). The LS estimates of the threshold in the three models are quite similar ($756, $852, and $852 respectively). 12 The regression results in Table 1 are consistent with those of Barro and Sala-iMartin (1992) and King and Levine (1993) . SpeciÞcally, we Þnd that initially rich countries tend to grow slower after controlling for the initial level of investment in human capital; that higher initial secondary school enrollment rates are associated with faster subsequent growth and that higher levels of Þnancial development are associated with higher growth rates. 13 However, the positive relationship between the level of Þnancial depth and economic growth that is found in the model without threshold effects, holds only for countries with high income per capita. In countries with low income per capita, there is no signiÞcant relationship between Þnancial depth and economic growth. This is reßected in the coefficient on Þnancial depth which is highly signiÞcant in the second regime (the high income group), but not signiÞcant in the Þrst regime (the low income group).
14 This evidence is consistent with the non monotonic relationship implied by our model.
In Table 2 , we replicate the same analysis using the initial values of Þnancial depth to investigate whether the predetermined component of Þnancial depth is associated with subsequent growth. The results of Table 2 clearly suggest that Þnancial depth is a good predictor for subsequent growth. The results concerning the non monotonic relationship between Þnancial depth and growth also hold when we use initial values: in the low income group, there is no signiÞcant relationship between initial Þnancial depth and subsequent growth whereas in the high income group, this relationship is positive and highly signiÞcant. 15 12 We employ the LM test on each of the two income groups to test whether we can split each of these groups into further sub-groups. For the high income group, the split produces inisginifcant p-values in all speciÞcations. For the low income group, we could not perform similar analysis due to the small number of observations. 13 Unlike the Þnancial depth indicator, the conditioning variables have only a fragile association with long term growth. These results are consistent with Levine and Renelt's (1992) sensitivity analysis. For completeness, we report the regression results for all three models though in the discussion of the empirical results, we focus only on the base regression model. 14 The only exception is model 3 where Þnancial depth is marginally signiÞcant in the Þrst regime. 15 Model 3 which incorporates the index of civil liberties and number of revolutions (both insigniÞcant) produces an insigniÞcant p-value (0.33) for the threshold estimate and hence the results for this model are not reported in Table 2 .
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a simple model which establishes the possibility of a non monotonic relationship between economic growth and Þnancial development. Applying a threshold regression model to King and Levine's (1993) data set we Þnd evidence consistent with the hypothesis implied by our model. The graphs show three of the possible dynamic patterns of the economy. In case a the economy suffers a poverty trap. Financial development occurs at y t ∈ [y * , y * (1 − α)φ). For any of these values, the growth rate of the economy with Þnancial intermediation is negative, so that as Þnancial development occurs the economy shrinks until Þnancial autarky is restored. In case b the economy shrinks subsequently to Þnancial development if and only if Þnancial development occurs at y t lower than point A. Otherwise, i.e. for values of y t sufficiently close to y * (1 − α)φ), the growth rate under Þnancial development is positive so that the economy converges to a self-sustainable growth path characterized by a steady state growth rate g * = (1 − α)ψ. In case c the growth rate under Þnancial intermediation is always positive so that the economy never experience vicious cycles. Moreover, we note that differently from the other two situation depicted above, the growth rate under Þnancial development is always greater than that under Þnancial autarky.
10 Table 1 -Growth and Financial Depth (1960-1989) GDP growth, 1960 GDP growth, -1989 . The list of explanatory variables is: RGDP60 = initial per capita GDP in 1960; SEC60=secondary school enrollment rate in 1960; LLY=ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP; GOV= ratio of government consumption to GDP; PI= the inflation rate; TRD= ratio of imports plus exports to GDP; CIVIL=Index of civil liberties; NREV=number of revolutions. GDP growth, 1960 GDP growth, -1989 
